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Abstract
Fitting with the theme of the special issue, this paper explores one way in
which discussions of the nature of scientific explanation can inform the proper
statement of explanatory inference. Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) ad-
vises reasoners to infer exactly one explanation. This uniqueness claim appar-
ently binds us when it comes to “conjunctive explanations,” distinct explana-
tions that are nonetheless explanatorily better together than apart. To confront
this worry, explanationists qualify their statement of IBE, stipulating that this
inference form only adjudicates between competing hypotheses. However, a
closer look into the nature of competition reveals problems for this qualified
account. Given the most common explication of competition, this qualifica-
tion artificially and radically constrains IBE’s domain of applicability. Using
a more subtle, recent explication of competition, this qualification no longer
provides a compelling treatment of conjunctive explanations. In light of these
results, I suggest a different strategy for accommodating conjunctive explana-
tions. Instead of modifying the form of IBE, I suggest a new way of thinking
about the structure of IBE’s lot of considered hypotheses.
1 The Challenge of Conjunctive Explanation
Sometimes two explanations are better than one. This may happen, for example,
in cases of “explanatory pluralism” when theories each do qualitatively different
explanatory work. An object’s existence can be explained either by referring to
its causes or its function—cf. (Wright, 1976). One hypothesis may explain an
event by telling us a causal-mechanical story leading up to the event, while an-
other may perhaps explain the same event by referring to a nomic regularity that
∗I owe special thanks to Vincenzo Crupi, David Glass, and attendees at the 11th MuST Conference
in Philosophy of Science on “Models of Explanation” (University of Turin, Italy; June 11-13, 2018) for
helpful conversations and feedback regarding this project. I am also very grateful for two sources
of financial support for this project. While working on this paper, I was supported by the Charles
H. Monson Mid-Career Award administered by the University of Utah’s Philosophy Department. The
research for this publication was also made possible through the support of a grant (#61115) from the
John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation.
†University of Utah, Department of Philosophy; 417 CTIHB, 215 S. Central Campus Dr., Salt Lake
City UT 84112; +1(801)585-5810 (office); jonah.n.schupbach@utah.edu.
2 CONJUNCTIVE EXPLANATIONS AND IBE
the event instantiates—cf. Salmon’s (1981; 2001) “friendly physicist” example. In
such cases, accepting a plurality of explanations provides us with a richer un-
derstanding of the explanandum. More generally, several explanations are better
than one just when the explanatory benefits of accepting them all outweigh the
costs (in complexity and otherwise). In such cases, I will say that the distinct
potential explanations in question are “conjunctive”, and I will refer to the above
observation as the phenomenon of “conjunctive explanation.”
The observation that there exist conjunctive explanations might seem mun-
dane. But conjunctive explanations apparently spell trouble for Inference to the
Best Explanation (IBE), at least in its simplest formulations. In an exchange with
Peter Lipton, Wesley Salmon criticizes IBE precisely for mishandling conjunctive
explanations. The problem, as Salmon (2001, p. 67) presents it, is with IBE’s
“uniqueness claim”: “The phrase, ‘inference to the best explanation,’ involves
a uniqueness claim that is difficult to justify.” IBE will bar us from inferring
truths, gaining richer understanding, accepting otherwise appealing explanatory
hypotheses, etc. in conjunctive explanation cases, since it ostensibly mandates
that we only choose the single best explanation.
In response to this challenge of conjunctive explanation, Lipton offers what
is now widely regarded as a necessary qualification on IBE: “[IBE] is meant to
tell us something about how we choose between competing explanations: we are
to choose the best of these. But among compatible explanations we need not
choose” (Lipton, 2001, p. 104; cf., 2004, pp. 62-63). Call this move “Lipton’s
hedge.” The suggestion is that Salmon’s criticism holds no sway against IBE once
it’s properly qualified. This is because IBE so hedged does not even attempt to
adjudicate between non-competitors, the working presumption being that con-
junctive explanations cannot compete with one another.
A proper evaluation of Lipton’s hedge must take into account what it means
for potential explanations to compete with one another. This question results in a
balancing act that Lipton and his followers must manage. To give IBE a formula-
tion that does not force us to choose between conjunctive explanations, Lipton’s
hedge restricts IBE’s domain of applicability to cases in which the alternative ex-
planations compete. In aiming to rule out the problematic cases (of conjunctive
explanation) and only these cases, this competition qualification is susceptible to
two potential errors. On the one hand, the account of competition might be too
strong, ruling out more than the problematic cases and overly restricting IBE’s do-
main of applicability. The problem in this case would be that IBE does guide us
in reasoning between explanations not considered to be competitors according to
such a strong account. On the other hand, to the extent that the proposed account
of competition is too weak (not ruling out all of the problematic cases), the chal-
lenge of conjunctive explanation remains. In this case, the problem would be that
conjunctive explanations can compete in the salient, weaker sense. And we would
not want IBE to force us to choose between such conjunctive explanations in such
a case any more than in cases where conjunctive explanations don’t compete. The
hope for Lipton and his followers then is that there is a plausible explication of
competition that strikes the right balance in order to rule out approximately all
and only the problematic cases of conjunctive explanation.
In this paper, I will argue that no candidate account of competition manages
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to strike the desired balance. A stronger “all-out” reading of competition allows
one to bypass the challenge of conjunctive explanation, but only at the expense
of absurdly restricting IBE’s domain of applicability. A weaker, more generally
palatable explication of competition fails to meet the challenge of conjunctive
explanation. This failure of contemporary accounts of competition to strike the
desired balance motivates a reassessment of Lipton’s hedge. I argue that Lipton’s
hedge was never needed in the first place by suggesting an alternative way of
responding to the challenge of conjunctive explanation. The upshot is a defense
of IBE, as traditionally formulated, with Lipton’s hedge completely trimmed.
2 All-Out Competition and the Ubiquity of IBE
Lipton’s hedge requires that the explanations being compared in any instance of
IBE compete with one another. But what exactly does it take for explanatory hy-
potheses to compete? In the above quote, Lipton goes along with a popular trend
in philosophy of science and assumes (perhaps only for the sake of simplicity)
that hypotheses compete only when they are incompatible. Potential explanations
may be incompatible by virtue of being directly inconsistent. Mutually exclusive
descriptions of flag pole height and position of the sun constitute incompatible,
competing potential explanations of the length of the pole’s shadow. But poten-
tial explanations may also be rendered incompatible by the evidence they aim to
explain. The hypotheses that John committed the robbery and that Bill committed
the robbery are compatible, but they may be rendered incompatible by evidence
showing that there could only possibly have been one robber acting in the case.
Either way, when explanatory hypotheses compete in the extreme sense of being
incompatible, they cannot possibly be true together. Accepting either potential
explanation accordingly provides us with a decisive case for rejecting the other.
Call this extreme notion of competition “all-out competition”—to be contrasted
with a less extreme sense of competition in the next section.
With respect to the challenge of conjunctive explanation, it’s easy to see the ap-
peal of explicating competition as all-out. Lipton’s hedge provides a convincing
response to this challenge, at least in part, because it invokes the extreme reading
of competition. If IBE only adjudicates between competing hypotheses, and com-
petition amounts to incompatibility, then IBE should manifestly require us to choose
at most one hypothesis. Conjunctive explanations pose no challenge at all to IBE,
because there is not a situation to which IBE applies in which we ever somehow
miss out by only inferring one explanation. The underlying assumption here is
that incompatible explanations cannot constitute conjunctive explanations, that it
is never explanatorily better to accept an unsatisfiable conjunction of hypotheses.
And that surely seems right.
So Lipton’s hedge, when teamed with the all-out notion of competition, rules
out all of the problematic cases of conjunctive explanation. But the natural follow-
up question to ask is whether it rules out only those cases. Are there cases in
which IBE helpfully guides us to infer between potential explanations that are
not all-out competitors? If so, then Lipton’s hedge overly restricts IBE’s domain
of applicability. This question is all the more pressing once one recalls a familiar
point commonly made by Lipton and explanationists more generally: that IBE is
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ubiquitous, being an extremely useful inference form with an impressively expan-
sive domain of applicability (Lipton, 2004, pp. 1-2). Does IBE lose its intuitively
expansive reach in light of Lipton’s hedge?
In fact, the answer is a troublingly emphatic and obvious yes. Many (indeed,
plausibly most) canonical instances of IBE compare potential explanations that
are compatible with one another. Indeed, this is true of nearly all of Lipton’s own
examples of IBE at work.
Lipton’s foremost example is the Semmelweis case. Working in the maternity
division of the General Hospital in Vienna in the 1840s, Ignaz Semmelweis strug-
gled to explain why three times more women in the first maternity ward were
dying of “childbed fever” than in the second ward of the same hospital. Ward
one was staffed by medical students, whereas ward two was overseen entirely
by midwives. The potential explanations considered and tested by Semmelweis
included the following:
H1. The midwives in ward two encouraged women to give birth on their sides,
whereas the medical students had women give birth on their backs. The
latter birthing position somehow promotes childbed fever.
H2. A priest was more often seen in ward one on his way to administering last
rites to dying patients. This has a pernicious psychological influence on
birthing women, which subsequently promotes childbed fever.
H3. Unlike the midwives, medical students in ward two were routinely conduct-
ing autopsies. Childbed fever is promoted by an infection of “cadaveric
matter” from the hands of such students.
Eventually, Semmelweis famously inferred H3 as the best explanation of his accu-
mulating evidence.
Lipton takes this to be a paradigmatic example of IBE at work, regularly draw-
ing upon this example to develop his account of the nature and power of explana-
tory inference. What Lipton does not seem to recognize is that his use of this ex-
ample clashes with his response to the challenge of conjunctive explanation. For
if IBE is only meant to “tell us something about how we choose between competing
explanations,” and competition is cashed out as “incompatibility” then Lipton’s
favorite example of IBE at work is in fact not an example of IBE at all. After all,
H1, H2, and H3 are manifestly compatible. Any combination of these hypotheses
could have been true prior or posterior to considerations of Semmelweis’s col-
lected evidence. If Lipton is right that IBE guides reasoning in the Semmelweis
case, then he is wrong that IBE only adjudicates between incompatible explana-
tions.
Upon further reflection, it’s plausible that such cases—in which IBE adjudi-
cates between compatible alternatives—are more the norm than the exception.
Explanationists commonly draw instances of IBE from such contexts as detective
work, historical science, medical diagnosis, and diagnostic settings more gener-
ally (e.g., diagnosing the failure of a car engine from the observable “symptoms”).
Unless explanatory hypotheses from such contexts are intentionally framed so as
to exclude one another, it is straightforward to think of such cases as often com-
paring compatible potential explanations.
Let us emphasize the point by glossing over a couple more examples. Lip-
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ton (2001, pp. 95-96) writes, “When a detective infers that it was Moriarty who
committed the crime, he does so because this hypothesis would best explain the
fingerprints, blood stains and other forensic evidence [...] Moriarty’s guilt would
provide a better explanation of the evidence than would anyone else’s.” Lipton
uses this example to demonstrate the fallibilistic nature of IBE; some other poten-
tial explanation than the best may turn out to be the actual explanation. But this
example can just as well be used to demonstrate the fact that it is possible, in very
typical cases, for more than one of the potential explanations compared by IBE
to be an actual explanation—i.e., that more than one of these turn out true, given
their joint satisfiability. In this particular example, the crime may after all have
been committed by Moriarty and someone else.
Scientists debate the explanation of the mass extinction at the Cretaceous-
Paleogene (K-Pg) boundary—which included the mass extinction of the dinosaurs
about 66 million years ago. Common potential explanations include bolide im-
pact, massive outbreaks of volcanic activity, climate change, continental drift and
sea level regression, and so on. Notably, while it is perhaps more common to look
for a “smoking gun” amongst these alternatives (Cleland, 2011, p. 554), many
scientists opt instead for inferring some combination of these alternatives—e.g.,
(Archibald et al., 2010). The scientists involved in this debate do not think of
the various alternatives as incompatible; instead they argue either that one alone
suffices as the best explanation of the evidence, or that more than one of the com-
patible alternatives should indeed be inferred—see (Schupbach and Glass, 2017)
for further discussion of this example. Accordingly, this is another case that the
explanationist will be keen to describe as potentially involving IBE, despite the
fact it involves reasoning between recognizably compatible alternatives.
In sum, if Lipton is right that IBE only provides a model of inference between
incompatible explanations, then he is wrong to think of the above (and any num-
ber of other such examples) as instances of IBE. But he’s not wrong about that;
these are paradigm examples of IBE at work, instances of IBE if anything is. And
so Lipton must be wrong in thinking that IBE only properly provides a model of
inference between incompatible explanations.
3 Lipton’s Hedge Refined
Lipton’s hedge, when combined with the all-out explication of competition pro-
vides a convincing response to the challenge of conjunctive explanation, but only
by absurdly restricting IBE’s domain of applicability. To pin the blame immedi-
ately on Lipton’s hedge itself however would be too quick. It may be that Lipton
is correct to think that IBE provides a model of inference only between competing
explanations, and that he only goes astray when he explicates competition as all-
out. That is, maybe the problem is not with the hedge per se, but with Lipton’s
identification of competition with incompatibility.
Recent work by Schupbach and Glass (S&G) proves helpful here. S&G (2017)
argue that competition is not plausibly explicated as mutual exclusivity. As they
claim and demonstrate through examples, it is simply too easy to think of actual
cases from various contexts of human reasoning in which recognizably compati-
ble hypotheses are thought of and inferentially treated as competitors. S&G thus
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offer a probabilistic explication of what it takes for hypotheses to compete with
one another in light of a body of evidence (as well as a formal measure of the
degree to which hypotheses compete with one another apropos some body of ev-
idence). Most importantly for our present purposes, their explication allows for
cases in which compatible hypotheses nonetheless compete.
S&G motivate their account of competition by suggesting that a “mutual ex-
clusivity” account falls short of a satisfactory, general account of competition in
no less than two ways. The first is that it implies that competition is all-or-nothing
(this objection applies equally well to the more general incompatibility explication
that Lipton invokes). But hypotheses may compete by disconfirming each other
to varying degrees without fully precluding one another. Consider the following
simple variation on Lipton’s detective case:
Moriarty and Smith, v1. Moriarty and Smith are both house burglars working in
the same area, but they are also sworn enemies who are extremely unlikely
to ever burgle together. Bob reports to the police that his front window has
been broken and that all of his valuable belongings are missing from the
house.
A detective investigating the case may rightly view HS: Smith burgled the house
and HM: Moriarty burgled the house as distinct (but compatible) explanations of
the reported evidence. Moreover, given the background information about Mo-
riarty and Smith’s relationship, the detective might rightly view these potential
explanations as competing to the extent that HS and HM disconfirm each other. To
make sense of such cases, S&G require that hypothesis competition be accounted
for gradationally, as a matter of degree.
Noting that hypotheses may compete to varying degrees helps shed light on
the nature of competition in cases where hypotheses disconfirm one another, but
to some less than maximal extent—as in Moriarty and Smith, v1. However, in
many actual cases, competing hypotheses may not even disconfirm one another
directly (i.e., prior to consideration of the explanandum). This is plausibly the
case in at least two of the examples we have described above. In the Semmel-
weis example, it is not at all clear that birthing position’s having an influence on
childbed fever rates would somehow lower the probability of a priest’s presence
also having such an influence. This is unclear, but it’s clear that these hypotheses
compete in this case. The nature of their competition with one another must come
down to something other than a disconfirmatory (probability-lowering) relation
between them then. Similarly, in the K-Pg extinction case, far from disconfirm-
ing one another (does volcanic activity decrease the chance of bolide impact?!),
some of these historical hypotheses may even confirm one another to some extent.
Nonetheless, many scientists persist in viewing these as competitors.
These observations point to another shortcoming with the mutual exclusiv-
ity account. It neglects an important sense in which hypotheses can compete—
indirectly, via the relevant body of evidence E. Consider another variation on
Lipton’s detective:
Moriarty and Smith, v2. Moriarty and Smith often rob houses together in well-
informed, carefully planned ways. They would never knowingly rob the
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police chief’s house. Moriarty knows that 123 Main is Bob’s house but
doesn’t know that Bob is the police chief; Smith knows Bob is police chief
but doesn’t know where he lives. E includes this information as well as
Bob’s recent discovery that his front window has been broken and that all
of his valuable belongings are missing from the house.
While HS and HM may confirm one another in general, the detective may rightly
consider them as competitors in this particular case; relative to this body of evi-
dence E, it’s unlikely they collaborated.
In cases of distinctively indirect competition, adopting either hypothesis un-
dermines any support E provides for the other. This may be because the evidence
itself places otherwise mutually confirming (or independent) hypotheses in a re-
lation of mutual disconfirmation with one another. Or it may be because the
evidence is fully accounted for by one of the hypotheses alone, in which case
no support from E accrues any longer for the other hypothesis. In order to make
sense of competition in cases like this, S&G require that an appropriate account of
competition accommodate two distinct paths to hypothesis competition: a direct
path and an indirect path via the evidence.
S&G develop a confirmation-theoretic measure of the “net” degree (taking
into account both the direct and indirect paths) to which hypotheses H and H′
compete with one another relative to a particular body of evidence E. The full
official statement of this measure is somewhat complex, but S&G prove a the-
orem that simplifies matters. They show that net degree of competition is for-
mally equivalent to average degree of disconfirmation conditional on E. Using
the log-likelihood measure of confirmation, the degree to which a proposition φ
disconfirms another ψ (conditional on a proposition χ) is measured as the degree
to which φ confirms ¬ψ (conditional on χ):
Cl(φ,¬ψ|χ) = log P(φ|¬ψ ∧ χ)P(φ|ψ ∧ χ) .
Thus, the net degree to which hypotheses H and H′ compete with one another
relative to a particular body of evidence E can be represented as follows:
Comp(H′, H/E) = [Cl(H,¬H′|E) + Cl(H′,¬H|E)]/2
=
󰀗
log
P(H|¬H′ ∧ E)
P(H|H′ ∧ E) + log
P(H′|¬H ∧ E)
P(H′|H ∧ E)
󰀘
/2.
Moreover, S&G explicate qualitative judgments of hypothesis competition as
positive degree of net competition; i.e., the judgment that H and H′ compete with
one another relative to E is explicated using the inequality Comp(H′, H/E) > 0.
Because net competition can (as above) be represented as average degree of dis-
confirmation, we may equally well explicate the judgment that H and H′ compete
with one another relative to E as an assessed positive degree of disconfirma-
tion, using the inequality Cl(H,¬H′|E) > 0 (or using Cl(H′,¬H|E) > 0, since
these imply one another). Or we may represent this judgment probabilistically as
P(H ∧ H′|E) < P(H|E)× P(H′|E). Finally—and this will prove the most useful
statement of all—Glass (2012, Theorem 1) proves that the following inequality is
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yet another equivalent condition for qualitative competition:
log
󰀗
P(E|H ∧ H′)P(E|¬H ∧ ¬H′)
P(E|H ∧ ¬H′)P(E|¬H ∧ H′)
󰀘
+ log
󰀗
P(H|H′)P(¬H|¬H′)
P(H|¬H′)P(¬H|H′)
󰀘
< 0. (1)
If we accept Lipton’s hedge, along with S&G’s explication of competition,
then IBE is no longer so absurdly restricted in scope. The resulting qualified
inference form again guides us in Lipton’s paradigmatic cases. Recall that in
both the Semmelweis case and the K-Pg extinction case (and potentially also in
the detective case, depending on the details), we take the potential explanations
involved to be at once perfectly compatible apart from the explanandum but to
compete relative to this evidence. The sense in which they compete is indirect.
But additionally, note that they compete indirectly not because E introduces an
incompatibility between them, but simply because any one of these explanations
arguably suffices on its own to account for E. In light of E, reason compels us to
choose between these potential explanations for the simple reason that accepting
more than one would arguably be epistemically overblown.
S&G’s account implies that this can be a genuine source of competition; this
is easiest to see in terms of the last formal statement of competition. Condition
(1) involves the sum of two terms, which can roughly be seen as respectively ex-
plicating the notions of direct and indirect degrees of competition.1 Examining
these two summands carefully sheds formal light on some exact paths to compe-
tition. Most relevant to our current purposes, note that the second summand—
corresponding to the notion of direct competition between H and H′—is effec-
tively a wash when H and H′ are approximately independent of each other. Fo-
cusing on the first summand in such cases then, H and H′ will be deemed com-
petitors with respect to E when the denominator is greater than the numerator,
P(E|H ∧ ¬H′)× P(E|¬H ∧ H′) > P(E|H ∧ H′)× P(E|¬H ∧ ¬H′).
Notably, this inequality can easily attain in cases where one, but really only
one, of the hypotheses is needed to account for the evidence. When this is true,
P(E|H ∧¬H′) and P(E|¬H ∧H′) will be quite high. In fact, even if both hypothe-
ses account for the evidence somewhat better than either individually, it will still
be the case that P(E|H ∧¬H′) ≈ P(E|H ∧ H′) and P(E|¬H ∧ H′) ≈ P(E|H ∧ H′).
By contrast, since one or the other hypothesis is needed to account for E in the
envisioned scenario, P(E|¬H ∧ ¬H′) ≪ 1. The upshot is that H and H′ com-
pete with respect to E in such a scenario, since P(E|H ∧ ¬H′)× P(E|¬H ∧ H′)≫
P(E|H ∧ H′)× P(E|¬H ∧ ¬H′). This is a prime example of a scenario in which
two hypotheses can strongly compete with one another (relative to some E) de-
spite the fact that they are otherwise entirely compatible with—possibly even
mutually supportive of—one another!
Qualified in this way, IBE requires us to choose between explanatory hypothe-
ses so long as Comp(H′, H/E) > 0. The new question is whether the proper
balance is now struck. IBE is not absurdly restricted in its domain of applicability,
but is it overly restrictive in what it allows us to infer? Unfortunately, it turns out
1Though only roughly. S&G themselves explicate degrees of direct and indirect competition sep-
arately, and they prove that net degree of competition is a simple sum of these two component mea-
sures. Unfortunately, there is no neat correspondence between S&G’s component measures and the
two individual summands in condition (1).
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that the challenge of conjunctive explanation comes back for revenge at this point;
there are hosts of cases in which it is problematic for IBE to require us to choose
between hypotheses that compete on S&G’s generalized account.
4 The Challenge of Conjunctive Explanation 2.0
Lipton’s hedge, combined with the all-out reading of competition, restricted IBE
to cases in which it indeed is always appropriate to infer at most one competing
hypothesis. But IBE, so restricted, lost much of its intuitively vast domain of
applicability. S&G’s construal of competition provides IBE with a wider, more
intuitive domain of applicability. But it reopens the door to cases in which it is
undesirable for IBE to keep us from inferring more than one of the alternative
hypotheses.
To see this, first consider a final variation on Lipton’s detective case:
Moriarty and Smith, v3. Moriarty and Smith are far and away the busiest and
most notorious house burglars working in a town. They are also sworn en-
emies who are extremely unlikely to ever burgle together. Moriarty always
leaves an “M” pendant at the scenes of his crimes, while Smith’s trademark
is to leave the water running into a plugged sink, flooding the houses he
robs. Bob reports to the police that his valuables are missing from his now-
flooded house, where he has also discovered the familiar “M” pendant.
A detective examining this case may rightly be strongly compelled to accept both
HS: Smith burgled the house and HM: Moriarty burgled the house. Given the evidence
of the case E, this certainly seems to be a better option than accepting HS or HM
alone. Two explanations are better than one here, making this a case of conjunc-
tive explanation. Importantly however, these explanations are not better together
because they mutually support one another but because they are both separately
supported by the evidence. E strongly confirms both HS and competitor HM in-
dividually, but it does nothing to unify them. HS and HM disconfirm one another
unconditionally and conditional on E.
Accordingly, S&G’s account validates the judgment that these hypotheses com-
pete. Applying condition (1) to this case, we have the following qualitative crite-
rion for competition between HS and HM:
log
󰀗
P(E|HS ∧ HM)P(E|¬HS ∧ ¬HM)
P(E|HS ∧ ¬HM)P(E|¬HS ∧ HM)
󰀘
+ log
󰀗
P(HS|HM)P(¬HS|¬HM)
P(HS|¬HM)P(¬HS|HM)
󰀘
< 0
Regarding the first summand, this case is meant to inspire the following judg-
ments. The evidence is by far best accounted for by the conjunction HS ∧ HM.
However, it is partially accounted for (made somewhat probable) by either hy-
pothesis taken alone (conjoined with the negation of the hypothesis). Since these
two criminals are far and away the most active burglars working in the area (and
given the presence in this case of their trademarks), the evidence remains very
unlikely indeed if neither criminal was at work. Probabilistically, we may expli-
cate these judgments simply using the following inequalities: P(E|HS ∧ HM) >
P(E|HS ∧ ¬HM) [P(E|¬HS ∧ HM)] > P(E|¬HS ∧ ¬HM). These inequalities fail
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Figure 1: Ln [P(E|HS ∧ HM)P(E|¬HS ∧ ¬HM)/P(E|HS ∧ ¬HM)P(E|¬HS ∧ HM)] plotted as a function
of y = P(E|¬HS ∧ HM) = P(E|HS ∧ ¬HM) and x = P(E|¬HS ∧ ¬HM)—with P(E|HS ∧ HM) fixed at
.95. Values in the displayed range tend to be negative (thus contributing to the fact that HS and HM
compete), and they are never strongly positive.
to determine whether the first summand above is positive or negative, but they
plausibly suggest that the term is negative or at least not strongly positive (Figure
1).
Now consider the second summand. Given that they are sworn enemies, “ex-
tremely unlikely to ever burgle together,” each criminal is much more likely to
have burgled a house generally if the other suspect did not. The assumption that
either criminal did in fact burgle a house thus makes it more likely that the other
did not (than did). Alternatively, given the same considerations along with the
suggestion that these burglars are collectively (though not typically conjointly)
responsible for the vast majority of burglaries in the area, the assumption that
either criminal did not burgle the house makes it more probable that the other
criminal did (than did not). Probabilistically, P(¬HS|HM) ≫ P(HS|HM) and
P(HS|¬HM) > P(¬HS|¬HM). The upshot is that the second summand cannot
but be negative, and the details of the case suggest that it is substantially so. It is
thus primarily because of this aspect of the case that we may safely conclude, on
S&G’s account, that HS and HM compete.
The fact that one would want to accept both HS and HM in light of E is ev-
idently not because they do not compete. That is, this is not intended to be a
counterexample to S&G’s account of competition. It is right to think of these
hypotheses as being (potentially strongly) in competition with one another with
respect to this evidence for the simple reason that they (potentially strongly) dis-
confirm one another—i.e., lower each other’s respective probabilities—in the light
of this evidence. Any justification accruing to HS ∧ HM in this case is accounted
for solely by way of E’s providing strong support for HS and HM individually,
and this despite the fact that each hypothesis goes some non-negligible way to
rebutting the other hypothesis conditional on E (and unconditionally). The ex-
ample thus serves to show that there are cases in which it would be explanatorily
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better to accept multiple, competing explanations of E; competing hypotheses can
provide conjunctive explanations.
Guided by the above example, it is not difficult to characterize formally an
entire family of such examples in which it can be explanatorily better to accept
multiple competing explanations than to choose between them. The following
jointly satisfiable2, probabilistically explicable conditions are characteristic of such
examples:
C1. H and H′ compete with one another with respect to E: Comp(H′, H/E) > 0,
and so P(H ∧ H′|E) < P(H|E)P(H′|E).
C2. E confirms each hypothesis individually, conditional on the other: P(H|E ∧
H′) > P(H|H′) and P(H′|E ∧ H) > P(H′|H).
C3. H and H′ together account for the evidence better than either does individ-
ually: P(E|H ∧ H′) > P(E|H ∧ ¬H′) and P(E|H ∧ H′) > P(E|¬H ∧ H′).
H and H′ may plausibly provide conjunctive explanations in such cases, at least
when E is explanatorily better accounted for by the conjunction H ∧ H′ than by
either hypothesis taken alone. That is, allowing that the inequality in likelihoods
used to explicate C3 may be achieved apart from explanatory considerations and
contexts, still certain explanatory virtues plausibly have their logical effect via just
such an inequality in likelihoods—e.g., power (Schupbach and Sprenger, 2011;
Schupbach, 2017). But then the problem of conjunctive explanation is once again
a serious problem, even for Lipton’s hedged version of IBE. H and H′ compete
with one another apropos E, but it can be explanatorily better to accept both than
to choose between them. IBE is problematic if it forces us to choose between them.
We want to be able to infer the conjunction H ∧ H′ as “the” best explanation of E
in cases like this, even if they compete.
The skeptical reader might wonder at this point whether it actually might be
epistemically worse to do what is explanatorily better in these cases. That is, one
might wonder whether the conjunction H ∧ H′ is overall worse off than H ∧ ¬H′
or ¬H ∧ H′, even if it happens to account for E better in the sense of making E
more likely. If the answer is ‘yes’, then perhaps we really do want IBE to force us
to choose between H and H′ in such cases, even if this may mean not doing what
is explanatorily best (though IBE would surely be in need of a new name in this
case). Thus, it is very much worth highlighting the subset of cases demonstrating
the consistency of C1, C2, and C3 with the following:
C4. H and H′ are overall more plausible together in light of the evidence than
either is alone (i.e., conjoined with the negation of the other): P(H∧H′|E) >
P(H ∧ ¬H′|E) and P(H ∧ H′|E) > P(¬H ∧ H′|E).
Cases satisfying C1-C4 are ones in which H ∧ H′ may have not only explana-
tory considerations, but overall net epistemic considerations in its favor—at least
assuming a Bayesian perspective from which net epistemic value is measured by
posterior probabilities. An inference rule is surely problematic if it precludes us
2In all cases, satisfiability was established using Fitelson’s (2008) decision procedure PrSAT as
implemented in his corresponding Mathematica package, available at http://fitelson.org/PrSAT/.
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from even considering the possibility of inferring H ∧ H′ in such cases. But that’s
just what Lipton’s hedge does, when combined with S&G’s generalized explica-
tion of competition.
5 Trimming Lipton’s Hedge
Let’s take stock. It can be explanatorily best to accept multiple distinct explana-
tory hypotheses. Such conjunctive explanations seem to pose a serious challenge
to IBE, since this inference form ostensibly guides us to infer the single best expla-
nation of our explanandum. Responding to this challenge, Lipton’s idea was to
qualify IBE by restricting it to cases in which we are comparing competing expla-
nations. However, given Lipton’s own interpretation of the notion of competition,
this qualification greatly over-restricts IBE’s domain of applicability, absurdly bar-
ring from the ranks many (perhaps most) of IBE’s canonical instances. Thankfully,
a subtler, generalized explication of competition does not seem to lead to this con-
sequence; however, it results in a hedged version of IBE that again fails to meet
the challenge of conjunctive explanation.
Explanations that compete, according to this generalized account, thereby each
provide some (possibly strong) reason against accepting the other(s). However,
we have highlighted the possibility that this reason may be outweighed by the
explanandum’s relation to each candidate explanation individually so that the
conjunction (of competitors) indeed provides the overall best explanatory account
of the explanandum. In other words, when explanations compete, there is some
reason not to accept both. But what ultimately matters is whether the explanatory
payoff outweighs the cost of accepting competitors. If there are net explanatory
gains to accepting multiple, distinct explanations, then IBE should allow us to
accept multiple explanations, regardless of whether they compete.
Attempts to meet the challenge of conjunctive explanation by hedging IBE
such that it only adjudicates between competing explanations do not alas appear
to be successful. Does this mean that the challenge of conjunctive explanation is
devastating for IBE? That may be the moral of this story if a competition hedge
were the only plausible way to respond to this challenge. But I want to suggest
that Lipton’s hedge was ultimately a distraction to IBE research. The final consid-
eration offered in the previous paragraph suggests that the question of whether
explanations compete is ultimately orthogonal to the central question of what is
explanatorily best. This observation inspires a straightforward response to the
challenge of conjunctive explanation that makes no mention of the notion of com-
petition.
Indeed, I suggest the simplest (some would say naive) formulations of IBE
can be understood as already providing a response to this challenge. The “chal-
lenge” of conjunctive explanation is thus only challenging for those who do not
understand the statement of IBE in the way I propose. The central question is
how to understand the phrase “the best explanation”. It is common to point to
one source of ambiguity in this phrase: the various, distinct dimensions along
which humans tend to evaluate the explanatory goodness of hypotheses (Schup-
bach, 2017, p. 41). However, another ambiguity underlies the means by which IBE
handles conjunctive explanations. On one reading, “the best explanation” might
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refer to the single most explanatory hypothesis. On another reading, “the best
explanation” might refer to the inference that is explanatorily best, i.e. the most
explanatory conclusion. The phenomenon of conjunctive explanation teaches us
that these two readings are indeed importantly different: the explanatorily best
conclusion might involve inferring more than one explanatory hypothesis.
Conjunctive explanations pose no threat to IBE when “the best explanation”
is understood in the second sense. If it is overall explanatorily best to infer multi-
ple distinct explanations (i.e., explanatory hypotheses), then that is exactly what
IBE will guide us to do when “the best explanation” refers to the conclusion or
inferential move that is overall explanatorily best.
It is tempting to think that the word “explanation” is, or at least ought to
be, always associated with a single explanatory hypothesis (however hypotheses
may be individuated) rather than with an explanatory inference, move, or conclu-
sion. It is certainly natural to use it in this way; this is in fact how I have largely
been using the word throughout this paper. If one insists that this is the only
proper usage, then the phrase “the best explanation” no longer is ambiguous in
the required way. However, the same straightforward response to the challenge
of conjunctive explanation plausibly remains available to IBE’s defenders, with
only minor adjustments to the statement of IBE. “Inference to the Best Explana-
tion(s)” or the clunkier “Inference to the Most Explanatory Conclusion” suggest
themselves as options.
That said, “explanation” and “the best explanation” do seem to be ambiguous
in the required way, allowing for the suggested interpretation. Recall the K-Pg
extinction case. As noted, scientists involved in this debate do not think of the
various alternative hypotheses as incompatible; but they also do not think of them
as necessarily being part of distinct explanations. While some of these scientists
hold out hope that one hypothesis alone suffices as the best explanation of the
evidence, many contemporary scientists accept more than one of the alternatives
as jointly constitutive of the fullest explanation. No clash arises here between the
inference of multiple explanatory hypotheses and IBE’s uniqueness claim, if the
uniquely best explanation (i.e., most explanatory conclusion) can take the form of
the conjunction of hypotheses under consideration.
This last statement of the point raises one final important question: if “the
best explanation” may refer to a conjunction of individual hypotheses, can it also
refer to other Boolean combinations of these? More generally, if we understand
IBE in the proposed way, then how should we think about the structure of IBE’s
lot of available, potential explanations? Plausibly, there is no principled ban on
the sorts of compound hypotheses we may consider for inference. Any form that
may provide superior explanatory goodness is up for consideration. If conjunc-
tions are allowed, why not disjunctions? Why not indeed? If a detective only
knows that a house has been broken into in a neighborhood where Smith and
Moriarty typically work alone, but are collectively responsible for the vast major-
ity of break-ins, the best explanation might in fact be the disjunction HS ∨ HM. To
commit to anything more specific than this would be to stretch the explanation
beyond what the evidence and background information of the case allow. But if
disjunctions are allowed, then why not material conditionals? And can’t denials
(in the form of negations) sometimes provide potential explanations?
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If “the best explanation” is associated with the most explanatory individ-
ual hypothesis, then it’s natural to think of the lot of considered potential ex-
planations as simply being the set of individual hypotheses. By contrast, the
present proposal amounts to thinking of the lot of potential explanations as the
set containing these considered hypotheses along with their Boolean combina-
tions. What matters is which combination of considered hypotheses best explains
the explanandum, not what logical form the various options take. Regarding
cases of conjunctive explanation, this move allows reasoners to infer more than
one individual hypothesis when that is the explanatorily best option, all the while
leaving IBE’s domain of applicability entirely open.
Note that this proposal does not amount to offering a different qualification
on IBE in the place of Lipton’s hedge. The point of this response is that there
is a way of understanding the simplest, unqualified formulations of IBE so that
conjunctive explanations don’t pose a challenge at all. The so-called challenge of
conjunctive explanation does not point to a weakness in IBE properly construed;
it rather betrays a misunderstanding of the most defensible statement of IBE. As
such, there was never a need for Lipton’s hedge in the first place. And that’s
a good thing, since this paper goes some way toward showing that this hedge
ultimately proves unworkable.
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